Abstract: Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin (1993) develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution concept -sequential reciprocity equilibrium  for which we prove an equilibrium existence result. The model is applied in several examples, and it is shown that it captures very well the intuitive meaning of reciprocity as well as certain qualitative features of experimental evidence.
INTRODUCTION
Reciprocity…is the key to every relationship.
(James Cromwell to Danny DeVito in L.A. Confidential)
Almost all of economic theory is built on the assumption that people act selfishly and do not care about the well-being of other human beings. Lots of recent evidence, however, contradicts pure selfishness. For example, Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler (1986) show in a seminal paper that consumers' opinions about price increases depend crucially on the costs of the firm, but not on the market conditions -a price increase due to cost increases is regarded as justified, while a demand shock is not a valid justification.
Whereas Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler's study deals with the fairness perceptions of consumers, experimental evidence suggest that actual behavior is also shaped by factors inconsistent with pure selfishness. For example, in ultimatum bargaining experiments people often reject allocations in which they receive a much smaller monetary payoff than their partners in favor of an allocation where neither player receives anything (see Roth (1995) for an overview). In gift exchange games, where two persons in turn determine how large gifts to give to one another, a large gift by the first mover is reimbursed by the second mover (see e.g. Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe 1995 , Falk & Gächter 2002 , Fehr, Gächter & Kirchsteiger 1996 . If the size of the gift of the first player is determined on an auction market, these gift exchange forces are even strong enough to prevent the market from clearing (see e.g. Fehr & Falk 1999 , Fehr, Kirchsteiger & Riedl 1993 .
These deviations from selfishness may have important economic consequences. As Fehr, Gächter & Kirchsteiger (1997) show experimentally, the set of enforceable contracts increases considerably due to non-selfish behavior. These effects are of particular importance for understanding labor markets. In a series of theoretical papers Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof & Yellen (1988 , 1990 show that fairness is a possible explanation why wages may be above the market clearing level so that involuntary unemployment occurs. Fehr & Kirchsteiger (1994) use this approach to explain why two-tier systems are rarely observed in reality. Bewley (1999) finds strong empirical evidence for the validity of these theories. When asked for the reason why wages remain above the market clearing level in recessions, managers and other labor market participants say that wage declines may destroy "working morale" -workers would decrease their working effort after a decline in wages which therefore cannot be enforced.
All this evidence suggests that people are not motivated solely by material self-interest. Also considerations of altruism, fairness, et cetera play a role. Among the models designed to capture some of these phenomena two prominent classes can be distinguished: models that focus on distributional concerns, and models that focus on a concern for reciprocity. 1 The distributional approach permits decision makers to be motivated not only by their own material gain, but rather by the final distribution of the material payoff. In Fehr & Schmidt (1999) , for example, it is assumed that for a given own material payoff a person's utility is decreasing in the difference between the own payoff and that of the counterpart. They show that much (selected) experimental evidence can be explained by their theory which, furthermore, has the advantage of being very close to standard models. There is, however, a certain cost. The assumption that individuals care only about final distributions implies that they must be indifferent concerning how distributions come about. This is problematic if in fact individuals regard information about their co-players' specific choices or intentions as important to their decision making.
2 Rabin (1993) convincingly argues that intentions play a crucial role when individuals are motivated by reciprocity considerations. 3 When a person wants to be kind to someone who was kind to her, and unkind to unkind persons, she has to assess the kindness (or unkindness) of her own action as well as that of others. To do this she has to consider the intentions that accompany an action. Take as an example the game Γ 1 in Figure 1 (where the given payoffs are in monetary units).
[Insert Figure 1 ]
Is F an unkind action? Clearly, this depends on what player 1 believes that player 2 will do. Suppose player 1 believes that player 2 will choose d. By choosing F player 1 then intends to give a payoff of 2 to player 2, whereas player 2 would get a payoff of only 1 if player 1 chose D. Hence, one may conclude that player 1 acts kindly if he chooses F. By an analogous argument, however, one must conclude that 1 is unkind if he chooses F while believing that 2 will choose f. This example shows not only that intentions are crucial in order to model reciprocity; it also makes clear that intentions depend on the beliefs of the players. Furthermore, the kindness of a player also depends on the possibilities he has.
Change the game of Figure 1 such that player 1's strategy set consists only of F -he has to "choose" F.
In such a game a "choice" of F is of course neither kind nor unkind -it is simply the only thing that 1 can do. Hence, in order to model the impact of intentions one has to take into explicit account both the possibilities and the beliefs of the players. This is what Rabin (1993) does. He assumes that the players in two-player normal form games experience psychological payoffs in addition to the underlying material payoffs. The former payoffs depend on the players' kindness, which in turn depends on beliefs. Given the belief of player i about the strategy choice of the other player j, i is kind to the extent that he believes he gives j a (relatively) high material payoff. In this sense, i's kindness depends on the payoff he intends to "give" to j, compared to the payoffs he believes it would be possible to give her -intentions and possibilities define the kindness of action. Similarly, how kind i believes j is depends on a belief of i about a belief of j, since j's kindness depends on j's belief. Rabin then models the psychological payoff as a concern for reciprocity such that i wants to be kind to j if he believes j to be kind to him (as long as the material payoff does not become too important for i). Notice that since the model involves belief-dependent motivations, the utility functions have to be defined on a richer domain than in standard game theory where payoffs depend on actions only. The framework of psychological game theory, developed by Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti (1989) , provides appropriate tools which Rabin adopts. He shows that a reformulation of his model using standard game theory is impossible -since intentions matter, models of reciprocal behavior have to lead to different results than an approach where beliefs are not allowed to affect payoffs directly.
However, Rabin points out an important limitation of his model. As it is a normal form construct it does not take into account the dynamic structure of a strategic situation, and "[e]xtending the model to sequential games is also essential for applied research" (Rabin 1993 (Rabin , p 1296 . If an equilibrium is calculated using the normal form of some extensive game, non-optimizing behavior may be prescribed at information sets that are not reached. The problem resembles that in usual game theory, where in Nash equilibrium players do not necessarily optimize off the equilibrium path. However, to handle this problem turns out to be more complicated than in usual game theory. As play unravels in a sequential game, a player who revises his beliefs may have to also revise beliefs about how kind other players are, since kindness depends on beliefs. Therefore, the way that the player is affected by reciprocity concerns may differ dramatically between different parts of the game tree. To illustrate all of this, consider the "Sequential Prisoners' Dilemma" game of Figure 2 , which is a stylized version of the experiments conducted by Fehr, Kirchsteiger & Riedl (1993 and which has been experimentally tested also by Clark & Sefton (2001) .
[Insert Figure 2 ] It can be easily shown that cooperation by player 1 (the choice C) and unconditional cooperation by player 2 (i.e., the choice c at each node controlled by 2) is one of the equilibria admitted by Rabin's theory (defined in the normal form of Γ 2 ), as long as the concern for material payoffs does not overcome the concern for reciprocity. 4 Unconditional cooperation of player 2, however, is very implausible. 1's choice of D guarantees that 2 gets a lower monetary payoff than she would get following the choice of C.
If 2 is motivated by reciprocity, why should she be kind after 1 chose such an unkind action? 5 The equilibrium is sustained because Rabin's normal form concept does not insist on optimization at 2's second node (which in the equilibrium is not reached). However, the problem cannot be solved merely by looking at the extensive form and mandating optimization at all histories of play. After all, for 2 to choose c at her rightmost node may be in her interest if she believes 1 is kind. The point is, though, that such a belief would make no sense, if 2 believes that 1's choice was deliberate and purposeful (as we will assume). Even if 2 initially believes that 1 is kind she should not maintain this belief after 1 chose D.
Rather she should then regard 1 as unkind, so reciprocity motives (in addition to selfish motives) would motivate her to take revenge by choosing d.
The general upshot is that a sensible model of reciprocity in sequential games must handle with care how beliefs change and how this affects reciprocity considerations. Incorporating such a "sequential reciprocity principle" is important in many potential applications which have a non-trivial dynamic structure. For example, the game in Figure 2 is a very stylized version of the fair wage effort models of Akerlof & Yellen (1988 , 1990 : The firm (player 1) makes a generous or greedy wage offer and the worker (player 2) decides whether to provide a high or a low working effort. Given the sequential structure of this game and other potential applications, it is crucial to derive a concept of sequential reciprocity. This is the main objective of our paper.
In our model, just as in Rabin's, kindness and perceived kindness range from negative to positive.
Reciprocation entails responding to positive perceived kindness with positive kindness, and to negative perceived kindness with negative kindness; by virtue of this "sign-matching" reciprocation adds to utility.
The main novelty of our approach is that we take account of how strategic choices and reciprocity motivation change as new subgames are entered, and that we impose that strategic choices prescribe best responses in all stages.
In order to highlight and isolate the consequences of sequential reciprocity, and in order to facilitate a comparison with Rabin's (1993) model, we focus exclusively on incorporating a concern for reciprocity (in addition to selfish motivation). We disregard distributional concerns. This is not to say that such concerns are unimportant. In reality both motives seem to play a role. 6 However, in this paper our objective is not to explain as many experimental findings as possible. Rather, we concentrate on reciprocal motivation and develop a model which is useful for analyzing its impact in sequential games.
We regard our approach as complementary to work that aims at modeling other motivational forces.
In the next section we present our model and define the concept of a Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium (SRE). In Section 3 we state an existence theorem for this concept. In Section 4 we apply the SRE concept to some well-known games, and discuss how reciprocity shapes the analysis. In Section 5 our approach is compared to Rabin's (1993) approach. Section 6 contains concluding comments. The theorem of Section 3, as well as some observations of Section 4, are proved in an appendix.
THE MODEL
In histories, that lead to subgames (∅ belongs to H and "leads to" the root). Let A i be the set of behavior strategies of i∈N; each strategy assigns for each history h∈H a probability distribution on the set of possible choices of i at h. Note that A i allows for randomization. Our favored interpretation of the concept to be developed entails that players make pure choices only. Nevertheless, the concept allows for randomization, which is to be interpreted in terms of the frequencies with which pure choices may be made in a "population". More comments on this follow later in this section.
Define A=Π i∈N A i . Using the assignment of payoffs to endnodes, we can derive a payoff function for each player which depends on what profile in A is played. Let π i : A→R denote this function. We shall refer to π i as player i's material payoff function. The material payoffs represent money, or some other objectively measurable quantity.
The material payoff is not the only payoff which we shall assume motivates i in his decision making.
To get i's utility, which is the function that i wants to maximize, we shall add a reciprocity payoff to i's material payoff. The reciprocity payoff depends on i's beliefs about other players' strategies and beliefs.
We represent beliefs as behavior strategies. However, in order to avoid confusion, we introduce separate notation for beliefs. Let B ij =A j be the set of possible beliefs of player i about the strategy of player j. Let C ijk =B jk =A k be the set of possible beliefs of player i about the belief of player j about the strategy of player k.
As exemplified by the discussion concerning the sequential prisoners' dilemma in the Introduction, a player's kindness and perception of another player's kindness may differ after different histories. In order to capture this it is important to keep track of how each player's behavior, beliefs, kindness, and perception of others' kindness differ across histories. We do this as follows: Let Γ be a finite multi-stage games with observed actions and without nature. With a i ∈A i , h∈H, let a i (h) be the (updated) strategy that prescribes the same choices as a i , except for the choices that define history h which are made with probability 1. For example, if h is the node where 2 moves in value of µ, we get b 21 (h)=D. The interpretation is that whatever 2 believes about 1 at the root of the sequential prisoners' dilemma, when she is asked to play after observing D she judges that 1 chose D with probability one. If µ>0, this form of updating is "Bayesian", given our favored interpretation of strategies involving randomization in terms of frequencies of pure strategies rather than as consciously randomized choices (cf. our comment about the interpretation of strategies involving randomization above, and the further discussion after Definition 4 below). If µ=0 the updating is still Bayesian, but of a particular form, reflecting an assumption that players treat the choices of others as purposeful and deliberate. In a game like Γ 2 this has the upshot that when 2 is asked to play after 1 chose D, she treats 1 as if he chose D on purpose rather than as if he tried to choose C but made a mistake. This is crucial to guarantee that our theory induces a retaliatory motive in game Γ 2 .
This way of updating beliefs handles the problem of how the preferences change when unexpected moves occur. Our solution is not, however, intended to tackle the general problem of what to conclude from moves that in equilibrium should not occur. Of course, in such cases the question arises why a "surprised" player should stick to his initial beliefs concerning later play, facing the fait accompli that the initial beliefs were incorrect for earlier play. This problem arises also in standard game theory for any concept of sequential rationality (e.g. subgame perfection), and it goes beyond the scope of this paper to address the matter. For a discussion of the problem in the context of standard games, see Reny (1992) .
We wish to capture that each player i wants to some extent to be kind in return to any player j who is kind to i. What does it mean for i to be kind to j? Suppose that i chooses a i ∈A i and that he believes that all other players make choices according to the profile (b ij ) j≠i ∈Π j≠i B ij . Following Rabin (1993), we note that player i then believes that he chooses in such a way that j's material payoff will be π j (a i ,(b ij ) j≠i ). He also believes that the feasible set of material payoffs for j is {π j (a i ',(b ij ) j≠i )|a i '∈A i }.
How kind i is to j can now be measured in terms of the relative size of π j (a i ,(b ij ) j≠i ) within this set.
While this measurement may be done in several ways, there is one particular aspect that must be handled carefully. Consider the following game Γ 3 , which is related to Γ 2 :
[Insert Figure In general, we proceed as follows. Define player i's efficient strategies by E i = {a i ∈A i | there exists no a i '∈A i st for all h∈H, (a j ) j≠i ∈Π j≠i A j , and k∈N it holds that
, with strict inequality for some (h,(a j ) j≠i ,k)}.
Intuitively, a strategy is inefficient if there exists another strategy which conditional on any history of play and subsequent choices by the others provides no lower material payoff for any player, and a higher material payoff for some player for some history of play and subsequent choices by the others. For example, in Γ 1 and Γ 2 all strategies are efficient for both players. In Γ 3 all strategies are efficient, except those strategies of player 1 that assign positive probability to the choice W.
If a i is an inefficient strategy, it involves "wasteful play" following some history h. Reaching h may be inconsistent with early choices according to a i . However, the equilibrium notion we develop (see Definition 4 below) requires optimal choices also after histories not played in equilibrium, with the player using strategy a i (h) instead of a i . It seems natural to us that inefficiency concerns then relate to wasteful play from h on. Our efficiency definition picks this up.
The definition of E i differs from the corresponding definition in Rabin (1993) . In Section 5 we discuss this in detail and motivate our modeling choice further. Here we move on to our definition of kindness, which is based on an idea of Rabin's: i's kindness to j is zero if he believes that j's material payoff will be the average between the lowest and the highest material payoff of j's that is compatible with i choosing an efficient strategy. 7 It is convenient to have a special notation which describes this number as a function of i's beliefs about the profile being played. We call this function π j e i , defined by
Think of π j e i ((b ij ) j≠i ) as a norm for i describing the "equitable" payoffs for player j when i's beliefs about other players' behavior are summarized by (b ij ) j≠i . We use π j e i ((b ij ) j≠i ) as a reference point for measuring how kind i is to j. If i chooses a strategy a i such that π j (a i ,(b ij ) j≠i )=π j e i ((b ij ) j≠i ), then his kindness to j is zero. Otherwise i's kindness to j is proportional to how much more or less material payoff than π j e i ((b ij ) j≠i ) that i thinks will be the consequence for j. More specifically:
Definition 1. The kindness of player i to another player j≠ i at history h∈H is given by the function
Intuitively, Definition 1 reflects the idea that i's kindness to j is proportional to "the size of his gift".
The definition differs from Rabin's analogous one which includes a normalization; see Section 5 for further discussion of this.
Having defined kindness, we now turn to reciprocity -the idea that if j is kind (unkind) to i, then i wants to be kind in return (take revenge). Since j's kindness depends on j's beliefs, i cannot observe j's kindness directly. However, i can consult his beliefs about j's actions and beliefs and draw inferences concerning j's kindness. We introduce a function λ iji to keep track of how kind i believes that j is to i: Definition 2. Player i's beliefs about how kind player j≠i is to i at history h∈H is given by the function
Since B ij =A j and C ijk =B jk , the function λ iji is mathematically equivalent to κ ji , although λ iji captures a psychological component that pertains to player i, not player j.
It is now time to specify the utilities which the players are assumed to maximize:
where Y ij is an exogenously given non-negative number for each j≠i.
Player i's utility is the sum of n terms. The first term is his material payoff, the remaining terms express his reciprocity payoff with respect to each player j≠i. The constant Y ij measures how sensitive i is to reciprocity concerns regarding player j. Our formulation admits that a player's reciprocity sensitivity varies depending on which other player is targeted. In application this may be useful; perhaps, for example and as assumed in Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2000) , a worker is reciprocally motivated towards his employer but not towards an unemployed outsider. If Y ij >0 the following is true: If i believes that j is kind to him (i.e., λ iji (⋅)>0), then i's reciprocity payoff with respect to j is increasing in i's kindness to j. Furthermore, the higher is λ iji (⋅), the more material payoff i is willing to give up in order to do j a favor. If i believes that j is unkind to him (i.e., λ iji (⋅)<0), then i's reciprocity payoff with respect to j is decreasing in i's kindness to j. This is the way in which U i reflects the idea that if i thinks that j is kind (unkind) to him, then i wants to be kind in return (take revenge). Of course, when i optimizes he may have to make tradeoffs between various reciprocity payoffs with respect to different players as well as his material payoff.
We can now append any game Γ with a vector of utilities (U i ) i∈N defined as above and get the tuple Γ * =(Γ, (U i ) i∈N ). We refer to any Γ * constructed in this fashion as a psychological game with reciprocity incentives. Note that such a Γ * is not a "game" in the traditional sense, since the utility functions U i are defined on domains that include subjective beliefs, and not only strategic choices.
We propose a solution concept that is applicable to any psychological game with reciprocity incentives.
We look for equilibria in which each player in each history chooses optimally given his beliefs. The players' initial first and second order beliefs are required to be correct, and following each history of play the beliefs are updated as explained above.
The definition of the equilibrium requires the following additional piece of notation: For any a=(a i ) i∈N ∈A and history h∈H, let A i (h,a)⊆A i denote the set of strategies that prescribe, for each player i, the same choices as the strategy a i (h) for all histories other than h. That is, A i (h,a) is the set of strategies i may use if he behaves according to a i (h) at other histories than h, but is free to make any
Definition 4. The profile a * =(a i * ) i∈N is a Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium (SRE) if for all i∈N and for each history h∈H it holds that
By condition (1) of Definition 4, a SRE is a strategy profile such that at history h each player makes choices which maximizes his utility given his beliefs and given that he follows his equilibrium strategy at other histories. At the initial stage, conditions (2) and (3) guarantee that the initial beliefs are correct. At any subsequent history, condition (1) requires that beliefs assign probability one to the sequence of choices that define that history, but are otherwise as the initial beliefs.
Because of (1), an SRE rules out profitable "local" deviations at any particular stage. The definition does not exclude the possibility that a "joint" deviation at several successive stages might increase a player's utility as evaluated at the first of the stages where the player deviates. However, we do not regard this as a drawback. Note that a player's preference between two different strategies, because of the updating of strategies and beliefs with respect to histories (as stated in Definition 3), can change during the play of the game. Hence, our framework allows for dynamically inconsistent preferences. 8 A player might have a multi-stage deviation, which is profitable according to the evaluation of an early deviation stage, even if his strategy is part of an SRE. But whenever this is the case, that player will no longer have an incentive to carry out the involved deviation at some later deviation stage (as seen by the fact that condition (1) must be applied to the history where the later deviation is supposed to occur). In order to realize such a multi-stage deviation, the player must be able to bind himself at the first deviation stage to follow the deviation strategy also at the other deviation stages. If such self-commitment were feasible, it should be modeled explicitly and thus should have led to a different game tree in the first place.
With Y ij =0 for all i,j∈N the optimality check involves material payoffs only. In this case Definition 4
requires that a * is a subgame perfect equilibrium in Γ (this follows from the "one-shot-deviation property" of subgame perfect equilibrium; cf. Hendon, Jacobsen & Sloth 1996) . In the next section we prove that at least one SRE exists in every psychological game with reciprocity incentives.
Definition 4 refers to behavior strategies, which may involve randomization. However, as commented on in two places earlier in this section, our preferred interpretation of our equilibrium notion does not incorporate conscious randomization by individual players; we envisage players as choosing pure strategies only. The probabilities specified by some randomized choice rather reflect frequencies with which pure choices are made, in some society where people from time to time play a given game. Our interpretation thus parallels John Nash's (1950) "mass-action" interpretation of the Nash equilibrium concept. 9 Of course, the problem arises of what to conclude from observing a move that is inconsistent with the initial beliefs, but this issue is not idiosyncratic to our approach and it goes beyond the scope of our paper to sort it out.
EXISTENCE
In this section we provide an existence theorem for our concept of a Sequential Reciprocity
Equilibrium. The proof is in the Appendix. Here we provide intuition for the techniques used, and explain why these differ from techniques commonly used in standard game theory. We also explain why the existence theorems in Geanakoplos et al (1989) are not applicable.
The difficulty of proving existence arises from the fact that kindness as well as believed kindness at some history h depend on the beliefs and second order beliefs about the actions following all histories. In particular, the belief about the behavior in histories that do not follow h is also important for the evaluation of kindness and expected kindness at h. Since in equilibrium beliefs have to be consistent with the equilibrium strategy profile, it follows that in games with reciprocity incentives it is in general impossible to determine equilibrium choices by looking at isolated subgames. Therefore, the backward inductive techniques that are usually used for proofs in standard game theory cannot be applied.
It may be illuminating to illustrate this impossibility with an example. Consider Γ 2 and the history where 2 moves after 1 has chosen C. To determine an equilibrium choice for 2 it is necessary to know her equilibrium belief of how kind is 1. Since 1's kindness depends on his belief of 2's behavior following the other history where she moves, it is impossible to determine 2's equilibrium behavior at the leftmost history without specifying what goes on also at the rightmost history.
The difficulty can be overcome by considering all histories simultaneously. Recall that Definition 4 requires robustness only against "local" deviations, at any particular history. Although a player at any history has his utility calculated with reference to strategies and beliefs that relate to choices at all histories, his actual optimization task locally refers to choices at that history only. There is sufficient structure to apply Kakutani's fixed point theorem to a best-reply correspondence that distinguish not only between players but also between the different histories at which they move. This technique allows us to show THEOREM. There exists a SRE in every psychological game with reciprocity incentives.
Proof: See the Appendix.
This result is not covered by the existence theorems for solutions of psychological games presented in
Geanakoplos et al (1989) . As mentioned in Section 2, Geanakoplos et al focus on psychological games where only initial beliefs may influence players' valuations of different strategy profiles, while in the psychological games with reciprocity incentives subsequent beliefs also have bearing on these evaluations.
APPLICATIONS
In this section we apply the concept of SRE to some well known games. This serves the purpose of showing how reciprocity motives affect the analysis. In each application we start with an extensive game that has perfect information and generic material payoffs, so the subgame perfect equilibrium for selfish players is unique and in pure strategies. We then calculate the SRE in the corresponding psychological games with reciprocity incentives. It turns out that even for generic material payoffs (and generic reciprocity parameters) the SRE need not be unique, as the first example (the Sequential Prisoners' Dilemma) shows. One might conjecture that the number of equilibria increases with the number of stages in games. However, that is not necessarily the case. Our second example (the Centipede game) shows that the SRE can be a unique in games with many stages. These examples also show that there need not exist an equilibrium in pure strategies.
The third example concerns a three-player game (So Long Sucker), and indicates the usefulness of our approach for games with more than two players. Furthermore, this example shows that in some games all players who make choices are unkind to each other along the equilibrium path. This result can be contrasted with the outcome in the second example, in which for large enough reciprocity parameters there is no SRE in which the players are unkind to one another. In fact, in the second example only positive emotions are predicted, in the sense that the players are kind to one another in the unique SRE.
In all applications we restrict our attention to equilibria for non-negative reciprocity parameters that are generic in the sense that the conditions on these parameters used for the characterization of equilibria (see below) are never fulfilled with equality. We allow for the case with vanishing reciprocity parameters (Y ij =0 for all i,j), which coincides with the standard approach without reciprocity. For each game, we first give a brief summary of how the subgame perfect equilibrium and the Sequential Reciprocity Equilibria look, and then provide a detailed calculation of these equilibria. The more lenghty proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
(i) The Sequential Prisoners' Dilemma
The first game we analyze is the Sequential Prisoners' Dilemma Γ 2 of Figure 2 , discussed in the Introduction. We will see that if player 2's sensitivity towards reciprocity 10 are more complex. In particular, when both players' reciprocity sensitivities are high enough, both cooperation and defection are compatible with equilibrium play for player 1. In the first case, the "reciprocal" behavior of player 2 induces player 1 to cooperate for material as well as reciprocity reasons. The second case is characterized by "self-fulfilling expectations". Along the equilibrium path each player believes that the other one is unkind, and hence is unkind in return. In each case the equilibrium is "strict" in the sense that no player has an "unused best response" at any history.
We now move to the detailed calculations. We first analyze player 2's behavior, which is summarized by two observations:
OBSERVATION 1: If player 1 defects (chooses D), player 2 also defects in every SRE.
To see this, note that for any possible strategy of 2, player 2 gets less when 1 chooses D than when he chooses C. It follows that whatever 1 believes about 2's strategy, 1's choice of D is unkind, and hence 2 must believe that 1 is unkind. Hence, the reciprocity payoff as well as the material payoff makes player 2 choose d. 
Proof: See Appendix.
As in Observation 4, the first of these cases is the intuitively plausible one -if 2 reciprocates with a high enough probability, 1 cooperates because of his material payoff as well as because of reciprocity reasons. If, however, reciprocity is important enough, there also exist other equilibria that are characterized by self-fulfilling expectations: If 1 believes that 2 initially believes that 1 chooses D, and that 2 defects in that case, 1 expects an unkind action of 2. This in turn leads 1 to be unkind, i.e. to play D (or to randomize). Of course, this only works when 1 is sufficiently motivated by reciprocity -if this is not the case, 1's material interest together with the reciprocal behavior of 2 make him cooperate.
(
ii) The Centipede Game
The next game we analyze is the Centipede Game, first introduced by Rosenthal (1982) . This is a twoplayer game with M≥2 nodes, denoted 1,2,...,M. At each odd node k player 1 can choose between staying in the game (choice f k ), or ending it (choice d k ). If 1 stays, the material payoff of 2 increases by two, whereas 1's payoff decreases by one, and node k+1 is reached (as long as the final decision node M is not yet reached). If 1 chooses d k , the material pay-off of both players does not change, and the game ends.
Hence, the strategy of player 1, s 1 , determines at every odd node whether player 1 stays in or ends the game. Similarly, player 2's strategy, s 2 , determines at every even node whether she stays in or ends the game. At the beginning of the game player 1 is endowed with one unit and player 2 with zero units of material payoff. The case of a Centipede with M=4 is illustrated in Γ 4 in Figure 4 .
[Insert Figure 4 ]
Denote by e(s 1 ,s 2 ) the first node at which one of the players ends the game, when they play according to their strategies s 1 and s 2 , respectively. Then the material payoffs are given by: All Nash equilibria of this game imply that player 1 ends the game at the first node. If Rabin's model is applied to the normal form of the game, then if reciprocity is important enough there are multiple equilibria. In some of these player 1 ends the game at the first node, but there is also an equilibrium where the players stay at all nodes in the game. When a version of the Centipede game was tested experimentally, most of the subjects stayed in the game at the first nodes (see McKelvey & Palfrey 1992 ).
In our model, as long as at least one of the players is sufficiently motivated by reciprocity, the unique SRE entails that both players stay in the game till the last node (where a selfish player chooses d M ). By staying a non-reciprocal player ensures that the other -reciprocal -player will regard him as kind.
This finding addresses an issue raised by Rabin (1993) who asks: "Can players force emotions? That is, can a player do something which compels another player to view him favorably?" Our analysis of the centipede game shows that answer may be yes. This finding is consonant with that of Dufwenberg (2002), who discusses "psychological forward induction" in a psychological game where a player is motivated to avoid feeling "guilty".
In order to give a complete characterization of equilibrium behavior, we first turn to choices at the last node which is controlled by player 2. Proof: See Appendix.
As to be expected, a reciprocal player will play f even at the very last node, whereas players with little reciprocity motivation will not. Note that the more stages the game possesses the less reciprocity motivation is needed to prevent the player from playing d even at the very last node. The reason is simple: The more stages the more often player 1 has already played f if the very last stage is reached.
Hence 1's kindness to 2 increases with M, and therefore less reciprocity sensitivity of 2 is needed to make 2 giving up material payoff in order to do 1 a favor. Proof: See Appendix.
Observation 3 shows that both players stay in game at all nodes as long as player 2 is sufficiently motivated by reciprocity, independently of 1's reciprocity parameter. This is the "psychological forward induction" result referred to above.
The next observation deals with the question whether  similarly to Observation 3  a sufficiently reciprocal player 1 can also sustain "cooperation" independently of the type of player 2. We know from Observation 1 that if player 2 has a low sensitivity to reciprocity, she ends the game at node M (if this node is actually reached Proof: See Appendix.
Observation 4 applies even to the extreme case where 2 is not being motivated by reciprocity at all (Y 2 =0). If 2's reciprocity parameter is in a medium range such that 2 chooses to randomize at the last node, cooperation to node M-1 is sustained even if 1's reciprocity parameter violates the condition of Observation 4. And if player 2 stays even at the very last node, we already know from Observation 3 that player 1 stays independently of his sensitivity to reciprocity. Hence, Observations 3 and 4 show that it is enough that one of the players is sufficiently motivated by reciprocity for both players stay to the last or to the last but one node. Furthermore, the observations also show that the more stages there are the easier it is to establish "cooperation".
(iii) So Long Sucker
We close this section by analyzing the game Γ 5 in Figure 5 , a modified version of a three-player game which Nalebuff & Shubik (1988) use to discuss certain aspects of vengefulness. It is a simple version of the game "So Long Sucker", once invented by John Nash.
[Insert Figure 5 ]
With ε=0, Γ 5 may be thought of as a model of a strategic situation in which a $4-pie is to be divided between three players. First player 1 has to choose which one of the other two players must get a zero payoff. Then the player who was "unfavorably" treated by 1 is called upon to decide which one of the other two will get which of the two positive monetary payoffs. Intuition may suggest that player 1 is a priori worst off of the three. Whoever he treats unfavorably will feel badly treated, and hence take revenge on 1 by awarding him the lowest possible monetary payoff. Effectively, player 1 will get a payoff of one, while players 2 and 3 look at expected payoffs of 1.5.
If each player was motivated solely by his or her own monetary income this outcome would not be guaranteed (in subgame perfect equilibrium), as players 2 and 3 would be indifferent between all their choices. In order to accommodate revenge, Nalebuff & Shubik modify the usual selfishness assumption, and assume that the players have lexicographically ordered objectives. Each player primarily maximizes his monetary rewards, but in case some choices yield exactly the same monetary payoff ties are broken so as to allow a player to take revenge. In Γ 5 , this works to 1's disadvantage.
Our model of sequential reciprocity allows a similar conclusion, also evoking a reciprocal sensation for player 1. This is true also when 2 and 3 incur some monetary cost ε>0 if they "punish" player 1. For any ε≥0, at 2's decision node 2 believes that 1 is unkind to 2 (λ 121 (⋅)<0), and that 3 is neither kind nor unkind to 2 (λ 323 (⋅)=0). Player 2 can get a positive reciprocity payoff only by choosing r 2 , since κ 21 (r 2 ,⋅)<0< κ 21 (l 2 ,⋅). For large enough Y 21 player 2 will choose r 2 as her material cost is swamped by the sweetness of revenge.
Analogous remarks apply at player 3's node, so in any SRE it is true that if Y 21 and Y 31 are high enough, then 2 and 3 choose r 2 and r 3 respectively. Yet, there are multiple equilibria which are characterized by "self-fulfilling expectations" much like in the first example this section. Both the pure strategy profiles (L,r 2 ,r 3 ) and (R,r 2 ,r 3 ) are equilibria. The following calculations for player 1 confirm this for (L,r 2 ,r 3 ):
κ 12 (L ,(r 2 ,r 3 )) = κ 13 (R ,(r 2 ,r 3 )) = -1.5 κ 13 (L ,(r 2 ,r 3 )) = κ 12 (R ,(r 2 ,r 3 )) = 1.5
Hence, it holds that u 1 (L,(r 2 ,r 3 )) =1+Y 12 ⋅(-1.5)⋅(-1)+Y 13 .(1.5)⋅0 > 1+Y 12 ⋅(1.5)⋅(-1)+Y 13 .(-1.5)⋅0= u 1 (R,(r 2 ,r 3 )) which shows that (L,r 2 ,r 3 ) is indeed a SRE. By an analogous argument, so is (R,r 2 ,r 3 ).
COMPARISON WITH RABIN (1993)
Rabin develops a theory of reciprocity for normal form games with two players. If we apply the concept of SRE to any two-player (single-stage) game with simultaneous moves, we get qualitatively similar conclusions as Rabin does in most cases. This indicates that the main difference between our model and that of Rabin is the requirement of sequential reciprocity we impose in games with an interesting dynamic structure. Yet the two models are also different in some other ways. In this section we review these differences and attempt to justify our modeling choices.
An obvious difference between Rabin's theory and ours is that we allow for more than two players (see, for example, the So Long Sucker game in Section 4, or the wage-setting games analyzed in Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger 2000). As concerns two-player games, if we were to make the following three changes to our model, and then if we applied it to any two-player extensive game that has no proper subgames we would get exactly the same solutions as Rabin does in the normal form of that game:
Change (ii): Modify Definitions 1 and 2 and redefine κ ij and λ iji as follows:
If the right hand side denominators take the value of zero, κ ij (a i ,(b ij ) j≠i ) and λ ij (b ij ,(c ijk ) j≠i ) are furthermore assumed to take the value of zero.
Change (iii): Redefine the notion of an efficient strategy (see Section 2) such that a i ∈A i is an efficient strategy given beliefs (b ij ) j≠i if there exists no a i '∈A i such that for all r∈R, and k∈N it holds that π k (a i '(r),(b ij (r)) j≠i )≥ π k (a i (r),(b ij (r)) j≠i ), with strict inequality for some (r, k).
Change (i) incorporates an additional motivational element which Rabin (1993 Rabin ( , p. 1287 argues is realistic. However, for the sake of simplicity we avoid it. In principle Change (i) can be applied to our model without adverse consequences, and we will not discuss this any further here. Change (ii)
represents a kind of normalization of the players kindness such that the reciprocity payoff is "dimensionless", in the sense that kindness is measured in units of the material payoff divided by units of the material payoff. By contrast we measure kindness in the same unit as the material payoffs (for example dollars). Change (iii) makes the definition of an efficient strategy dependent on players' beliefs, whereas according to our definition efficiency is a belief-independent property.
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Changes (ii) and (iii) are somewhat problematic in the context of general multi-stage games. To see this, consider the game Γ 6 in Figure 6 .
[Insert Figure 6 ] Assume first that only Change (ii) is made in our theory. Suppose that in equilibrium it holds that a 2 =b 12 =p⋅f+(1-p)⋅d with p<1. A direct calculation involving the relevant function outlined in Change (ii) invoking Change (iii) leads to non-existence of equilibria in some games. In our theory this problem does not arise because efficiency of a strategy is a belief-independent property. According to our definition, there are no inefficient strategies in Γ 6 regardless of b 12 .
Our efficiency definition may also shed some light on the emergence of "trust". Rabin (1993, Fig. 3) considers a "partnership game" here reproduced as G 7 in Figure 7 .
[Insert Figure 7 ] Rabin suggests that (Trust, Share) may be a reasonable outcome, but notes that the outcome is not an equilibrium in his model. To see why, note that with Change (iii) and beliefs corresponding to the profile Rabin (1993) derives many general implications of his model, and we close this section by pointing out how our theory escapes one of the more gloomy ones. Rabin's Proposition 6 assures the existence of an equilibrium where no player is kind. In many games there are also happy equilibria where (both) players are kind, but in these cases there must exist multiple equilibria and in at least one of these no player is kind. Our analysis of the Centipede game in Section 4 shows that this result has no general counterpart in our theory. If the players in Γ 4 are sufficiently motivated by reciprocity, then the SRE is unique and both players are kind.
It is, however, not true that our theory guarantees for all games the existence of a happy outcome where all players are kind. This follows from the analysis of the So Long Sucker game Γ 5 in Section 4, where along the equilibrium path of any SRE player 1 and player 2 or player 3 view each other as unkind.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As we have seen our approach is able to capture the intuitive meaning of reciprocity as well as the stylized facts of experimental games that show the importance of reciprocal behavior. We propose that our model may serve as a useful tool for analyzing the implications of reciprocal behavior in several important economic problems. In Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2000) we apply our model to investigate employer-employee relationships. We show that reciprocity can explain why employers are reluctant to hire workers who offer to work at less than the prevailing wage, a phenomenon frequently observed in labor markets (see Bewley 1999) . Reciprocity may moreover play an important role in contract theory, in situations that are potentially plagued by moral hazard. Our approach can then be used to analyze how reciprocity changes the set of incentive-compatible contracts, the nature of an optimal contract, and to what extent incentive problems can be overcome in such a situation.
It may also be of interest to confront our model with experimental data. In this connection we wish to point to a few considerations that may be important. First, the crucial role played by beliefs in our theory (and in Rabin's) suggests that it may be necessary to explicitly measure beliefs in the laboratory.
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Second, some tests of our theory might restrict attention to Definitions 1-3 without connecting to the concept of SRE in Definition 4. Suppose that in an experiment first and second order beliefs are measured alongside the strategic choices, so that the experimenter can measure the subjects' kindness and perceived kindness. It is now possible to test whether an individual subject is reciprocally motivated and updates his or her beliefs in the way that Definitions 1-3 suggest. To also test whether all the interacting subjects have coordinated on a particular SRE may correspond to a further independent hypothesis.
Third, it should be noted that we have chosen to work with utilities as given by Definition 3 because this is the simplest formulation we can think of that invokes a concern for reciprocity. This simplicity comes at a cost which may have bearing on experimental testing. The utility U i , specified in Definition 3, will not represent i's preferences in a way which is invariant with respect to the choice of monetary units. To see this, note that if i's monetary payoff is measured in dollars, then the reciprocity payoff will have the dimension of dollars squared. At the cost of considerable analytic complexity, this problem can be solved by defining player i's reciprocity payoff with respect to each player j as Y ij times the square root of the absolute value of κ ij (⋅)⋅λ iji (⋅), adjusted so as to maintain the right sign. If one wanted to estimate a parameter like Y ij based on experimental data for different games, it might be sensible to adopt such an approach.
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Experimentalists should take into account, however, the limits of the scope of this paper. We deliberately focus on modeling a concern for reciprocity, and disregard other motivations like altruism, equity, envy, let-down or guilt aversion, or concern for the least well-off individual. As noted in the Introduction, it is clear that this omission is not innocuous. For example, in experimental Dictator games individuals often give away lots of money (see Davis & Holt 1993, pp. 263-269 for a discussion), something which cannot be explained by the model we propose in this paper. In reality people seem to be motivated in many different ways, and perhaps this all depends not only on the strategic nature of a situation but also on other aspects of the context where the situation occurs. For example, in the case of Dictator games the evidence reported by Hoffman, McCabe & Smith (1996) suggests that "social distance" is important in that context, and Kirchsteiger, Rigotti & Rustichini (2001) show that the nature of motivations may depend on "mood". We leave for future research the delicate task of determining in what context one or another motivational concern is of particular importance. It seems clear that when this issue is tackled, experimental and theoretical work should go hand in hand.
APPENDIX
Proof of the Theorem: Let X i (h) be i's set of (possibly randomized) choices at history h∈H. If x∈X i (h), let a i (h)\x be the strategy of i's which specifies the choice x at h, but which is otherwise just like a i (h).
Define correspondences β i,h : A→X i (h) and β: A→Π (i,h)∈N×H X i (h) by
The sets Π (i,h)∈N×H β i,h (a) and A are topologically equivalent, so β is equivalent to a correspondence γ:A→A which is defined in the obvious way. Fixed points under γ are SREs. To see this, note that β i,h caters to condition (1) of Definition 4, plugging in the correct beliefs as mandated by the conditions (2) and (3). Thus β i,h effectively finds the optimal strategies in A i (h,a), in conformance with (1), although this is here done using the optimal choices in X i (h). β and γ are combined best-response correspondences, and since γ is a correspondence from A to A it is amenable to fixed point analysis.
It remains to show that γ possesses a fixed point. Berge's maximum principle guarantees that β i,h is non-empty, closed-valued, and upper hemi-continuous, because X i (h) is non-empty and compact and U i is continuous (since π i , κ ij , and λ iji are all continuous). β i,h is furthermore convex-valued, since X i (h) is convex and U i is quasi-concave (in fact linear) in i's own choice. Hence, β i,h is non-empty, closedvalued, upper hemi-continuous, and convex-valued. These properties extend to β and γ. It follows by Kakutani's fixed point theorem that γ admits a fixpoint.
Applications: equilibrium. In order to have an equilibrium that involves randomized choice, the utility of cooperation must be equal to the utility of defection. This is the case when Y 2 ⋅(2-p'')=1. Since in equilibrium the second order belief must be correct, the actual probability of cooperation, p, must be such that the condition is fulfilled. This implies that p=(2⋅Y 2 -1)/Y 2 . In order to have a equilibrium involving randomized choices, the utility of cooperation must be equal to the utility of defection. This is the case when 1+Y 1 ⋅(2⋅q''-1)=0. Since in equilibrium the second order belief must be correct, the actual probability of cooperation, q, must be such that the condition is fulfilled. This implies that q=(Y 1 -1)/2⋅Y 1 .
Proof of Observation 4:

Proof of Observation 5:
Notice that 2 0.5 1 Y < < implies that 2 cooperates with probability p=(2⋅Y 2 -1)/Y 2 when 1 cooperates, and 2 defects when 1 defects (see Observations 1 and 2). Hence, 1 can give 2 a material payoff of at least 0 and at most 1⋅p⋅+2⋅ (1-p) . Hence, the "equitable" payoff of 1 is 0.5⋅(1⋅p+2⋅(1-p)) = (2-p)/2. If 1 chooses cooperation, 2 receives 1⋅p⋅+2⋅ (1-p) ''∈[0,1] this second order belief of 1 choosing C. Then 1 believes that 2 believes that she gives player 1 a material payoff of q''⋅(p⋅1+ (1-p)⋅(-1))+(1-q'' )⋅0 by her equilibrium strategy. If 2 always cooperates, 1's payoff is q''⋅1+ (1-q'')⋅2, whereas if 2 always defects, 1's payoff is q''⋅(-1)+(1-q'')⋅0. Hence, 1's belief about 2's kindness of her equilibrium strategy is q''⋅(p⋅1+ (1-p In order to have a equilibrium involving randomization, the utility of cooperation must be equal to the utility of defection. This is the case when 2⋅p-1+ Y 1 ⋅(2-p)⋅( 2⋅q''⋅p-1)=0. Since in equilibrium the second order belief must be correct, the actual probability of cooperation, q, must be such that the condition is fulfilled. Substituting for p this implies that q= Y 2 ⋅(2-3⋅Y 2 +Y 1 )/(2⋅Y 1 ⋅ (2⋅Y 2 -1) ). The other conditions of Observation 5c are necessary to guarantee that q is larger than zero and smaller than 1.
(ii) The Centipede Game:
Proof of Observation 1: Notice first that the only consistent belief of 2 about 1's strategy is that 1 stays in the game at all nodes he controls. Given this belief about 1's strategy, 2's strategy could give 1 a material payoff of at least 0 (by ending the game at node 2, i.e. the first node she controls) and at most M/2 + 1 (by staying at all nodes she controls including node M). Hence, the "equitable" payoff of 1 is In order to calculate how kind 2 believes 1 is when 1 stays in the game at all nodes he controls, we have to specify 2's belief of 1's belief about 2's choice at the node M. Consistency of beliefs about 2's strategy implies that 2 is believed to stay in the game at all nodes that precede M. Denote by p'' the second order belief that 2 chooses f M , i.e. 2's belief of 1's belief of the probability that 2 stays in the game at node M. Then 2's belief about how much payoff 1 believes he gives to 2 by always staying in the game is p''M/2+ (1-p'') (M/2+1)=M/2+ (1-p'') . Clearly, this is at node M-1, player 2 receives M/2+ (1-p) . Therefore, 1's kindness of staying in the game at all nodes including M-1 is M/4+ (1-p) 
